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Leanne Todd* Structured Settlements and
Structured Judgements: Do They
Work and Do We Want Them?
I. Introduction
Structured settlements are an alternative to traditional lump sum
settlements for personal and fatal injuries claims. Under a structured
settlement the defendant, generally a casualty insurer, satisfies all or part
of the claim via periodic payments to the plaintiff.
The object of this paper is to investigate the effectiveness of structured
settlements to determine the desirability and feasibility of structured
judgments. Note that structured settlements are voluntary and courts
currently reject any notion that they have inherent jurisdiction to grant
damages in any form other than lump sum.
Analysis will be undertaken on both an academic and application basis
via scholarly and industry writings as well as interviews with lawyers,
judges and representatives of the insurance industry.'
II. Structures - why do we need them?
The purpose of personal or fatal injuries damage compensation is
restitutio in integrem, meaning to place the victim in a position similar to
that he or she would have been in but for the tortious act. Traditionally
this has been achieved in the form of lump sum damages, the purpose of
which is to give the plaintiff a capital amount which if properly invested
would generate a fund capable of fully compensating the plaintiff during
his or her lifetime for any losses or ongoing expenses resulting from the
tort. Exhaustion of the fund is intended to coincide with plaintiffs death.2
The inherent risks associated with this form of compensation are evident.
a) Mortality Risk - The plaintiff bears the risk that he or she will
live longer than anticipated when the damages were calculated creating
a shortfall. Conversely there is the possibility that the plaintiffs estate will
enjoy a windfall due to premature death. The crux of the problem is the
uncertainty of forecasting future events. In MacDonald v. Alderson
3
O'Sullivan J.A. questioned the validity of calculating damages on an
estimated life expectany which could prove to be totally inappropriate.
* Leanne Todd, LL.B. 1989, Dalhousie University
1. The author wishes to thank all those who assisted her in the preparation of this paper.
2. Justice Dickson, as he was then, defined lump sum awards in Andrews v. Grand & Toy
Alta. Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, at 260.
3. [1982] 3 W.WR. 385 (Man. C.A.).
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I have some difficulty with the idea that a lump sum should be calculated
in such a way that it will be used up over an assigned life expectancy.
Some live shorter and some live longer. It would be imprudent for the
recipient of a damage award to invest and spend it on the basis that his
award would be exhausted over the period of his assigned life expectancy;
if he did so he would be a pauper at the end of the period of his anticipated
life; how could he survive if he lived longer than his expected years? ...
what is sought to be given to the plaintiff is an amount that is likely to
enable the plaintiff to be compensated for as long as he suffers damage
from the tortfeasor, over the length of his actual life.4
b) Financial Management - The plaintiff bears the responsibility,
risk and expense of "properly investing" the capital amount of the lump
sum such that it will adequately provide for the loss. The plaintiff is left
vulnerable to the dangers and worries of a dynamic economy. One bad
investment could have long-term implications for the plaintiff's basic
care. Some courts and settlements allow a gross-up of special damages for
financial management fees. Although this allowance is of some assistance
it does not remove the free market risk.
c) Dissipation - U.S. studies indicate that ninety per cent of
windfalls are dissipated within a five year period.5 For a seriously injured
plaintiff who has lost all or part of his income earning capacity this means
that he will become reliant on family and or the state for his basic care
needs.
d) Miscalculation - Damages are calculated on uncertain
predictions of future needs and losses, the plaintiff bears the risk of
miscalculation such that the award will prove inadequate over time.
While the defendant bears the risk of being over charged, the implications
are far more serious for the individual who has lost income earning
capacity than for a casualty insurer or uninsured defendant who
maintains this capacity.
e) Income Tax Liability - Although Revenue Canada has taken the
position that damages for personal and fatal injuries are not taxable, the
interest income generated by such funds is liable to taxation. This is of
significance to lump sum awards which are intended to compensate the
plaintiff when combined with the resulting interest income. Some
jurisdictions in Canada allow a tax gross-up which is intended to offset
the anticipated income tax liability.6 Tax gross-ups are only allowed on
4. Ibid, at 399-400.
5. Edwin Upenieks, "Structured Settlements, Are They Here to Stay?" (1982), 3 Advocates
Quarterly 393, at 406.
6. British Columbia has adopted the view that the S.C.C. rejected the concept of income tax
adjustments in the Trilogy by not providing for them in those cases, reference Leischner v. West
Kootney Power and Light Company, [1986] 3 W.WR. 97 (B.C.S.C.). Ontario however has
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the future care head of damages for personal injuries and for lost support
for dependants in fatal injury claims. The average for future care tax
gross-ups is thirty five percent.7 Tax gross-ups require the court to forecast
the future income tax rate, the interest income to be earned, the time
period and the future care costs which will be subject to taxation.8 Clearly
without some adjustment or consideration for tax liabilities the plaintiff
will be under compensated.
f) Non-Reviewable - The common law doctrine of finality means
that damages are once and for all, the plaintiff cannot return to the
defendant for more money. This is incongruent with the ongoing nature
of personal and fatal injury claims and forces damages to be assessed on
speculative future needs and events.
The inadequacies of lump sum compensation and the need for reform
of our tort compensation system has been the subject of many critical
comments by both academics and practitioners. One of the more
memorable cries came from Justice Dickson, as he was then, in Andrews:
The subject of damages for personal injury is an area of the law which
cries out for legislative reform. The expenditure in time and money in the
determination of fault and of damage is prodigal. The disparity resulting
from lack of provision for victims who cannot establish fault must be
disturbing. When it is determined that compensation is to be made, it is
highly irrational to be tied to a lump sum system and a once and for all
award.
The lump sum award presents problems of great importance. It is
subject to inflation; it is subject to fluctuation on investment; income from
it is subject to tax. After judgment new needs of the plaintiff arise and
present needs are extinguished; yet our law of damages knows nothing of
periodic payment. The difficulties are greatest where there is a continuing
need for intensive and extensive care and long-term loss of earning
capacity. It should be possible to devise some system whereby payments
would be subject to periodic review and variation in light of the
continuing needs of the injured person and the cost of meeting those
needs.9
Justice Dickson's pleas have gone unmet by the legislatures of Canada,
statutes enabling the courts to employ reviewable awards or periodic
payment plans have not yet come to pass. However there has been
rejected this position and allows tax gross ups for future care damages. In a notorious case of
late, McErlean v. Sarel (1987) unreported, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that a trial gross-
up of 153% of future care damages was excessive and reduced it by half. Note that in Nova
Scotia there has not yet been a decisive holding on this matter but the plaintiff bar and casualty
insurance industry have taken the view that Nova Scotia will follow the Ontario courts, thus
for purposes of negotiating structured settlements tax gross-up is considered.
7. John P. Weir, Structured Settlements, (Toronto: Carswell Legal Publications, 1984).
8. Note that some care costs are tax exempt.
9. Andrews, supra note 2, at 236.
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development outside of the court's jurisdiction, parties can and have
voluntarily employed structured and reviewable settlements. 10
While calling for legislative reform Justice Dickson and the Supreme
Court of Canada addressed the arbitrary nature of damage assessment for
personal injury cases in what has been labeled "The Trilogy"." The court
established an itemized approach to personal injury damage assessment
which increased the precision and reviewability of awards. "The Trilogy"
also marked a shift in the objective of damage assessment. The itemized
heads of damage looked more to the plaintiff's needs versus loss.12 Note
that a needs approach to damage compensation not only allows greater
precision, but is more directly responsive to the basic principle of damage
compensation, placing the plaintiff in the position he would have been in
but for the injury. However, the uncertainties associated with income tax
adjustments: inflation, life expectancy, future care needs, and lost income
earning potential, still remain.
There is no doubt that the "Trilogy" has improved lump sum awards,
but only insofar as they more closely meet the plaintiffs needs; most of
the risks still remain as does the need for a better alternative. The
administrative burden has been increased as a result of the "Trilogy",
there would appear to be a direct relationship between administrative
and evidentary burden and the precision and fairness of compensation.
III. History of Structures
Structured settlements have been viewed by many as the way of the
future in personal and fatal injury compensation and structured judgment
as the natural consequence of that development. To appreciate the role
that structures currently play and could play in the future of our tort
compensation system, we must look at the history and adequacy of
personal injuries compensation in Canada.'
3
10. The only reviewable settlement reported to date is Steeves v. Fitzsimmons (1975), 110
O.R. (2d) 387 (H.C.), where the injuries sustained by a living child prior to birth were too
speculative to be definitively calculated until later years.
11. Andrews, supra note 2; Arnold v. Teno, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287; Thorton v. S.Dist No. 57
Bd of Trustees, [197812 S.C.R. 267.
12. The itemized heads of damages identified in the "Trilogy" are:
(1) pecuniary loss - full compensation for,
a) special damages
b) prospective loss of earnings and profits
c) cost of future care
(2) non-pecuniary loss - fair and reasonable compensation;
includes pain and suffering, loss of life expectancy, loss of amenities of life.
13. Because of the differences in damage assessment between personal and fatal injuries this
paper will focus on the former, although it is equally applicable to fatal injuries with slight
modification in damage assessment.
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The history of structured settlements dates back to the early 1950's
when they were first employed in Sweden, France, West Germany,
Australia and New Zealand. Only Sweden has evolved to a mandatory
structured judgment system of compensation.
4
Structures were next seen in the United States, where in 1958 a jury
imposed a structured judgment. 5 Since that time structures have been
used extensively in voluntary settlements and some states have passed
legislation enabling courts to impose structured judgments, although this
experience has not been altogether successful.' 6 The ever growing size of
damage awards in the United States provides a catalyst for the use of
structures because they represent a significant savings to the insurance
companies.' 7 Some of the more notable American cases which employed
structures in their settlements were the thalidomide cases of the 1960's
and the Ford Pinto cases of the 1970's.
The thalidomide cases of the late 1960's are generally recognized as the
central catalyst introducing structured settlements into North America. In
1968 structured settlements arrived in Canada when eight sets of Ontario
parents brought friendly actions to the Supreme Court of Ontario for
approval of structures negotiated in the United States in conjunction with
thalidomide claims in that country. 8 By 1983 structured settlements were
being employed in a significant percentage of the large personal injury
claims19 and in notable cases such as the fatal injuries claims resulting
from the Ocean Ranger disaster.20
The growth of structured settlements in Canada can be attributed to
the increasing number of million dollar awards for personal and fatal
injuries. Prior to 1980, such awards were rare, but the "Trilogy"
combined with growing future care costs and tax gross-ups have made for
a significant increase.21 Further impetus has been derived from the
"Insurance Crisis" of the 1980's, the availability and affordability of
14. Upeneiks, supra note 5, at 395.
15. M& P Stores v. Taylor, 326 P. 2nd 804 (Okl Sc).
16. As many as fifteen states within the United States have adopted the Model Periodic
Payment of Judgment Act. See Weir, supra note 7, at 36.
17. William Monopoli, "New Way to Settle Suit Wins Favor", FinancialPos Jan 17/81.
18. Weir, supra note 7, at 9-11.
19. Justice Holland, "Structured Settlements in Injury and Wrongful Death Cases" (1987), 8
The Advocates Quarterly 186.
20. "All Could Benefit from Insurance Plans", Halifax Chronicle Herald" Jan 11/84. $7.1
million dollars was paid out by casualty insurers to fund structured settlements with a potential
payout of $23 million dollars to the dependants of victims of the Ocean Ranger disaster.
21. Note that the casualty insurance industry believes that claims for personal and fatal injuries
are lower in this region than they are in others such as Ontario, where the average income is
higher resulting in a higher claim for lost future earning capacity. Industry writings indicate that
the average size of claim is increasing and can mainly be attributed to rising future care costs.
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insurance is being threatened by the rising size of damage awards,
coupled with depressed investment income in the insurance industry.
In 1980 the Ontario Commission on Tort Compensation (the Holland
Commission) acknowledged certain benefits of structures and
recommended that the Ontario Courts of Justice Act be amended to
allow judges to award structured judgment where both parties
consented. 22 This amendment was not passed until 1984 and has yet to
be judicially considered.23 The failure of structured judgments on consent
can be attributed to two factors; first, if parties were prepared to consent
to a structure they would be inclined to do so prior to incurring the
expenses of litigation. Secondly, the availability of tax gross-ups
encourage the plaintiff to take the risk that the court will overcompensate
them by virtue of a generous tax adjustment.24 In jurisdictions where tax
adjustments are not recognized the plaintiff would be more inclined to
structure while the defendants would be discouraged by the absence of
the tax gross-ups and resulting loss of relative savings. Further, in a
structured settlement the defendant would want to compensate the
plaintiff with after tax dollars for lost future income capacity because the
plaintiff would not be liable to tax under a structure while a court
applying the rule in Jennings25 might use pre-tax dollars in the
calculation of this head of damage.26
The year 1986 saw the Ontario Task Force on Insurance (the Slater
Report) recognize the benefits of structures and while not endorsing
structured judgments, it did recommend a future review of both
structured judgments and income tax reform.27 The Ontario Branch of
the Canadian Bar Association filed with the task force a proposal for
structured judgments, thereby indicating support of the concept within
the practising bar.
An Inquiry into Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation in Ontario
(the Osborne Commission) was held in 1987. It too considered
mandatory structured judgments, in particular a rather extensive proposal
22. Commission on Tort Compensation Report Toronto, August 1980.
23. S.0.1984, c.1l, s.129.
24. Courts have traditionally tended to err on the plaintiff's side because of the grave
implications of under compensation for the plaintiff. See David Harvey, "Structured
Settlements", Canadian Underwriter, April 1987, at 28.
25. R v. Jennings, [19661 S.C.R. 532, later affirmed by the S.C.C. in the trilogy. The case held
that lost future earning capacity was a capital asset and should be assessed on pre-tax dollars,
with the intention that the anticipated tax liability on the anticipated interest income from the
lump sum will roughly equate with the difference between pre-tax and after-tax dollars.
26. Bruce Feldthusen, Mandatory Structured Judgments" (1988), 1 Canadian Insurance Law
Review 1, at 11-18.
27. Final Report from the Task Force on Insurance, Law Reform Commission of Ontario,
May 1986. (55,59).
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was prepared by a company specialized in structured settlements. Further
analysis of periodic payment was undertaken by the Law Reform
Commission of Manitoba in 1987.28
IV. Structured Settlements- how they work
Structures are intended to avoid the pit falls of lump sum damages,
particularly the mortality, investment, dissipation and miscalculation
risks in addition to avoiding the additional expense of financial
management and tax gross-ups. Obviously if structures are able to
achieve these objectives they are an improvement on our current tort
compensation system and should be investigated for further exploitation
of their benefits. An analysis of structured settlements, how they work
and their effectiveness is the basis for evaluating the desirability of
structured judgments.
To recap, structured settlements are voluntary agreements whereby the
defendant satisfies all or part of a damage claim for personal or fatal
injuries in the form of periodic payments to the plaintiff.29 A settlement
has been defined as a business bargain in which the plaintiff sells his claim
to a private buyer for the best price he can get and the buyer negotiates
for as little as he has to pay. The amount of the settlement will be affected
not only by legal principles, but by factors such as the uncertainty of
litigation and the extent of the plaintiff's needs.30 Because structures are
settlements, they generally occur prior to trial, but after litigation has
commenced. Many lawyers find that settlement discussions arise so late
in the proceedings that there is no time to prepare or assess a structure
alternative. In such cases the trial date could be deferred or the trial could
proceed as scheduled with the parties negotiating a structured settlement
after a judgment has been rendered for a lump sum. There is nothing in
the various civil procedure rules to preclude this alternative. Such a tactic
could improve the bargaining position for a structure, especially if there
is a collection risk due to the award exceeding the liability limit covered
by the casualty insurer or the absence of insurance coverage. Further the
judgment would serve as a useful guideline in determining the value of
the claim.
Judicial recognition of structured settlements has been limited. By
nature, settlement occurs outside the jurisdiction of the courts. However,
28. Report on Periodic Payment of Damages for Personal Injuries and Death, Manitoba Law
Reform Commission, Winnipeg 1987.
29. Note that the defendant is usually not the actual tortfeasor but the tortfeasor's casualty
insurer who will accept liability to the extent of the agreed policy limits after which point the
defendant tortfeasor's personal assets are subject to recovery.
30. P.S. Atiyah, Accident Compensation and the Law, (1975), at 279.
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there are two roles the courts can play in regard to structured settlements.
First is in the pre-trial conference, many judges take the opportunity of a
pre-trial conference to encourage parties to settle where there is no
substantial question of liability. If the case at hand is appropriate for a
structure the court could prevent the time and expense of litigation by
suggesting the possibility of a structured settlement.3 1 The second role for
the court is to approve a settlement concerning infants or incompetents.32
Courts have been receptive to such settlements.
The lump sum and periodic payments of the structure are the subject
of an agreement between the parties and cater to the plaintiff's needs as
nearly as possible. In effect a structure is a financial package which
represents a budget for life for the plaintiff. Tailoring of the structure is
achieved by including in the agreement any combination of a number of
options. Terms and options of the structure are limited only by the
imagination of the parties and the funding available. The following list is
representative of options currently employed:
a) Up-front lump sum - This is used for the out of pocket expenses
to date, past lost wages, any necessary remodelling of the plaintiff's living
accommodations, special transportation needs, special equipment,
lawyer's fees, etc.
b) Rehabilitation payments - For any special rehabilitation
requirements.
c) Medical payments - Cover all future care costs.
d) Income payments - Substitute for lost future earning capacity.
e) Education Payments - Cover any special or post secondary
education expenses for the plaintiff or plaintiff's dependants as agreed.
f) Balloon payments - These are pre-arranged future lump sum
payments either for specified capital expenditures such as a new
wheelchair or they can be left to the plaintiff's discretion.
g) Reserve fund - This is a single sum payment which will be
compounded until such time as it is required to restructure the income
payment, pay for extraordinary medical or other expenses ie: death
benefits.
31. Taylor v. Bottle et at [1982] C.C.H. 88-587 (Ont. Dist. Ct.). The court acknowledged a
lack of jurisdiction to award a structured judgment but prior to making an order advised the
parties that a structured settlement was appropriate and encouraged them to consider the
option. Subsequently a consent judgment was ordered for a structured settlement.
32. Civil procedure rules require that settlements for infants and incompetents be approved by
the court. The process is little more than a rubber stamping in most jurisdictions because
counsel are expected to have acted with all due diligence on behalf of the infant or
incompetent. For a thorough analysis of the evidentary requirements of a court when reviewing
a proposed structured settlement see Fusch v. Brears et al [1986] 3 W.W.R. 409 (Sask.Q.B.).
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h) Indexing - This is used to counter inflation and can be fixed or
tied to a variable factor such as cost of living or the inflation rate.
i) Reversionary Interest - The annuity can be arranged such that
after the plaintiffs death and the minimum guaranteed payout, the
defendant casualty insurer receives the balance between the principle
paid and any amounts paid out.
33
These options, like options on a new car, all increase the cost of the
package. As such they are a matter of negotiation between the parties.
Structures are funded by one of three possible financial vehicles, trust
fund, self funded or annuity.34 In practice, annuities are the only
acceptable vehicle because neither the trust fund nor self funded methods
satisfy the requirements of Revenue Canada; thus, do not offer the same
tax saving advantages.35 Further, plaintiff counsel would not be willing to
accept a self funded structure because the casualty insurer does not enjoy
the same financial integrity of a life insurance company regulated under
the Canadian and British Life Insurance Company Act.
36
The negotiation of structured settlements requires a certain familiarity
with structures and what they are capable of. The primary rule is never
agree to a structure without knowing it's principle value because the
awesome nature of the figures associated with structures and the diversity
of alternative structures makes relative assessment difficult. The principle
value offers the only consistent guideline for evaluation between structure
alternatives and between structures versus lump sum. Many defence bar
resist disclosing this information, but a telephone call to another
structured specialist with the details of the proposal will generate an
approximate principle value. Needs analysis and structure design are the
major components of negotiation, both are critical to achieving a
workable and desirable structure.
37
The complexity of structures is evident and as in most complex areas
of our society, specialists have arisen. Most if not all structures are
arranged through and implemented by structured specialists. There are
33. This list represents a composite of information gained from various articles and industry
material. For an additional reference of options see Leon Lewis, "Tailoring the Structure", Law
Society of Upper Canada Continuing Education Material April 23, 1983.
34. For a full explanation of financing options see Weir, supra note 7, at 36-47.
35. These requirements are set out in Interpretation Bulletin IT-365R2 and will be discussed
later in this paper.
36. R.S.C. 1970, c.I-15, s.64(2). Note that no Canadian life insurance company has failed
since Confederation, this is in sharp contrast to the United States where there is valid concern
for the financial integrity of life and casualty insurance companies and a corresponding concern
for the potential default on annuities. See Holland, supra note 19, at 191.
37. A complete review of negotiating principles is beyond the scope of this paper, for a
comprehensive reference see Weir, supra note 7 and various information distributed by the
structure specialists.
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three prominent firms in Canada which offer structure services to plaintiff
and defendant bar without charge.38 These firms act as brokers, earning
a commission from the annuities they purchase for the structure. All life
insurance companies offer competitive commissions to minimize any
conflict of interest for the specialist between his commission and the
better interest of the parties. The structure specialist is a non-adversarial
role and relies on complete disclosure of the parties to develop
appropriate alternative structure proposals.
The structured settlement market is extremely competitive, not only in
the pricing of annuities, but in the services specialists provide. The
creative initiative which developed structures, continues to develop new
and different structure designs to add to the advantages already present.
Specialists are also improving their service through the use of computers,
for example McKellar's recently introduced a new "Catastrophic Loss
Spread Sheet" which greatly simplifies the analysis of proposed structures
for complex personal injuries cases. Further development is evidenced by
the use of life insurance for the primary caretaker of the plaintiff. In many
cases care is provided by family members at no or greatly reduced
expense. A structure can provide an annuity which will pay life insurance
premiums on the life of the primary caretaker. If they should predecease
the plaintiff then the payout will be used to fund another annuity for the
additional cost of a replacement caretaker. This arrangement avoids over
compensation in the years when care costs are low, while ensuring that
the higher financial burden can be met when and if it materializes.
Specialists support a broad variety of educational undertakings
concerning structures. They frequently host in-house seminars for law
and insurance firms and associations. They actively participate in
commissions and task forces where structures are discussed, putting
forward information and proposals for reform. In general the specialists
take a very pro-active role in the development and marketing of
structures.39
It is important to remember that structures are merely an alternative to
lump sum damages, not a replacement. Structures are not appropriate in
every case situation, their application is fact specific. Some general
guidelines have emerged for situations that would be most benefited by
structures:
a) Awards exceeding $50,000 - It is difficult to justify the
additional administrative cost of a structure relative to the savings which
38. Baxter, Henderson and McKellar are the three structure specialist firms in Canada.
39. For examples of specialist involvement in education and reform see the 1987 Osborne
Commission and the Insurance Institute of Ontario Structured Settlement Seminar 1988.
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could be achieved from an award smaller than $50,000. Situations
concerning children are generally excepted from this rule because such
cases would involve minor injuries and deferred payment of even a small
amount can result in a substantial amount in ten to twenty years time.
Amounts as small as $10,000 to $20,000 have been structured for
children. A second exception are plaintiffs who are currently in a high tax
bracket or would be pushed into a higher tax bracket by the interest from
the lump sum thereby incurring significant tax loss.
b) Infants - Cases involving infants are nearly always appropriate.
Because of the longer life expectancy period the resulting increase in
calculation risks of such damages could be minimized by a structure. The
caution here is inflation and some appropriate protection from the
payments becoming worthless over the extended period anticipated.
While the tax savings aren't initially as good for children as they are for
adults, structures can extend exemption from tax lability beyond age
twenty-one. Despite attempts to bring the interest rate provided by the
Official Guardian's Office into line with commercial rates a structure
probably offers as good a return if not better.
c) Serious bodily injury - The more serious the injury the greater
the future care costs and subsequently the greater benefit structures have
to offer either by avoiding the tax gross-up, or where gross-ups are not
allowed, by lessening the under compensation of the plaintiff due to
income tax liability.
d) Financial management - In cases where the plaintiff is
intellectually impaired or an infant they are precluded from exercising
good financial discretion and outside management is required. Outside
financial expertise is also prudent where the award is of such a size that
the average person could not be expected to have the ability to manage
it efficiently. Structures have the advantage that they are self managing,
avoiding any management cost and guarantee payment and protection
from premature dissipation due to poor management or investment.
e) Reduced life expectancy - Sub-standard mortality rates are only
available on investments attached to life expectancy such as annuities and
they provide a higher rate of return than traditional investment vehicles.
f Tax gross-ups - This additional expense can be avoided by the
use of a structure.
g) Fatal injury claims - These claims are intended to compensate
the surviving dependants for their loss of support. This loss is assessed on
after tax dollars and is subsequently subject to tax gross-up where
available. This expense can be avoided by the use of a structure and the
periodic payments will more closely replace the lost support. Further,
children do not receive the same special tax exemption for interest
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income on fatal injury damages that they do on personal injury damages.
This will be discussed under the tax advantages of structures later in this
paper.
h) Significant lost future earnings - The Jennings case established
that future lost earnings were to be calculated on a pre-tax basis and not
subject to gross-up.40 The view was that any overpayment of lost earnings
created by not deducting the income tax that the plaintiff would have
been liable for, would approximately equal the anticipated tax liability
for the interest income earned on the lump sum damages. There is a
strong argument that this rule would not apply to structures because the
plaintiff will receive all payments tax free and to calculate the damages
on the basis of pre-tax versus post tax dollars would be to overcompen-
sate the plaintiff, therefore a structure should be able to save the
difference of the tax. Any argument that future lost earning capacity is
not appropriate for periodic payment is rejected. Although Jennings held
that future earning capacity is a capital asset, there is no ready market
where such an asset can be liquidated. Further, periodic payment more
closely simulates the loss than does a lump sum.
i) Excess limits claims - There are claims where the damages
exceed the liability limit contracted between the defendant casualty
insurer and the defendant tortfeasor thus leaving the tortfeasor's personal
assets at risk. These cases pose collection expenses and bad debt risk, it
is often possible for the claim to fit within the liability limits if it is
structured. The structure alternative protects the plaintiff from the
expense of collecting against the defendant tortfeasor's personal assets, if
indeed there are any or enough assets and precludes a bad faith suit by
the defendant tortfeasor against the defendant casualty insurer.41
j) Dependants - Structures offer security for both plaintiff and their
dependants. They can be especially useful in funding post secondary
education of dependants.
k) Deferred Future Loss - Where loss will not accrue for some time
the damages can be correspondingly deferred until it is anticipated that
they will be required. For example, a plaintiff may be able to continue
employment for a period of time prior to their injuries deteriorating their
ability to do so.
40. Supra, note 25.
41. Pelky v. Hudson Bay Ins. Co., [1982] I.L.R. 1-1493 (Ont. H.C.). A bad faith suit by a
defendant tortfeasor against his casualty insurer, alleging a failure to reasonably settle within
the policy limits. The court considered the insurer's duty and while they failed to establish any
guidelines the case clearly indicates that it would be unreasonable to discard any offer to settle
without due consideration.
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1) Multiple Parties - Structures can make the best of a situation
where there are limited funds to compensate multiple plaintiffs. Similarly,
it is useful where there are multiple defendants.
Structures are generally not recommended where there is substantial
consumer debt that could not be satisfied by a lump sum component
within the structure, for example a house mortgage. These liabilities carry
a higher interest liability than an annuity could generate.
The savings made possible through structures varies dramatically
according to the award. They have been reported to be as high as fifty
percent, but average between ten to forty percent.42
V. Advantages of Structures
Structures offer distinct advantages overcoming many of the pit falls of
lump sum awards.
a) Income Tax Advantages - Relief from the tax gross-up is the
most commonly touted advantage because it realizes the greatest financial
saving of structures over lump sum. Revenue Canada has traditionally
treated damages received for personal or fatal injuries as free from tax
liability, but any resulting interest income as liable to taxation. With the
introduction of structures, Revenue Canada took the position that the
method of payment, periodic or lump sum, was irrelevant to the
characterization of the income; thus, periodically paid damages for
personal injuries enjoy the same preferred tax treatment as lump sum
damages. This policy is not directly expressed in the Income Tax Act,43
but in Interpretation Bulletin IT-365R2.44 The following are requirements
established in the bulletin:
s. l(a) limits the special provisions to damages for personal and fatal
injuries.
s. 2 clarifies that amounts for special or general damages are exempt
from tax liability even if they are calculated with reference to lost
income.
s. 3 clarifies that structures funded by an annuity to make periodic
damage payments to the plaintiff are not considered to be annuity
contracts for purposes of subsections 12.2(3) and 56 (1) and that the
payments themselves are not considered to be annuity payments.
42. See Weir, supra note 7, "Structured Settlements the Claims Persons View", [May, 1988]
For The Defence, 29.
43. S.C. 1970-71-72. c 63.
44. This bulletin was issued May 8, 1987, replacing IT-365R and Special Release IT-365R
May 25, 1984. The latest bulletin did not alter but reaffirmed and clarified Revenue Canada's
earlier position.
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However an annuity purchased by a plaintiff with funds received for
personal or fatal injuries is liable to taxation.
s. 4 stipulates that no portion of the damages will be liable to tax even
if calculated with reference to interest. However where an amount for
damages is held on deposit or in trust all such interest income is
taxable. Note, this precludes structures funded by trust funds from
enjoying the same status as those funded by annuities.
s. 5 defines structured settlements for Revenue Canada's purposes and
lists the criteria that structures must meet:
(a) there must be a claim for damages in respect of personal or fatal
injuries.
(b) the claimant and the defendant insurer must have an agreement
whereby damages will be paid on a periodic basis.
(c) the defendant insurer must;
(i) purchase a single premium non-assignable, non-commutable
and non-transferable annuity which produces payments as
agreed between the defendant insurer and the plaintiff.
(ii) make an irrevocable order to pay the plaintiff. Note this
protects the plaintiff should the defendant insurer default because
creditors would not be able to seize the annuity as an asset of the
insurer.
(iii) retain a contingent liability for the payments in case the
annuity should default.
Advanced tax rulings are individually binding decisions by the tax
department on a particular tax matter. In the early days of structures such
rulings were sought as a matter of course, now with IT-365R2 and the
prevalence of structures it is not necessary except in cases where
compliance is questionable or there is a substantial deferment period
prior to payments commencing. The process is relatively inexpensive and
expedient. Often, when required, structured specialists will make the
application as part of their service.
Revenue Canada's requirements clearly make the defendant casualty
insurer owner and annuitant with the plaintiff as a third party beneficiary.
Subsequently, it is the defendant casualty insurer who must report the
annuity payments as taxable income, but will not be liable for tax
because of offsetting claims and payout expenses.
The implications of the tax treatment is that the interest income
generated by the annuity will never be subject to tax. The defendant
avoids costly tax gross-ups; the plaintiff avoids under compensation due
to tax liability and Revenue Canada underwrites the dollar savings.
While Revenue Canada is forgoing potential taxable income, their
position with respect to the non-taxable nature of payments to the
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plaintiff under structures is not inconsistent with their traditional policy.
Further the social benefits derived from structures represent a potential
savings for government, it is argued that the relative loss is minute, if at
all existent, because the annuity market creates jobs as well as taxable
corporate and personal incomes.45
There has been a lobby in Canada to remove tax liability from interest
income on damages payments. To date this scheme has been resisted
because it is a marked shift from Revenue Canada's traditional position
and now that structures are available to achieve the same end without tax
reform the necessity has decreased. It is not clear how administratively
feasible such a scheme would be because plaintiffs would have to
distinguish the damage principle and interest income from their personal
savings and interest income. Politically such a policy would not likely
meet with much support because of our current period of fiscal restraint
and the fact that on the face of it the insurance industry and not the
plaintiff would stand to gain the greatest benefit.
The greatest tax advantages are gained for either very large awards
where the tax liability would be significant or for the plaintiffs whose
marginal tax bracket would be increased by the interest income generated
by the lump sum damages. The benefit for children is not initially as great
as it is for adults because paragraph 81(1) (g.1) of the Income Tax Act
exempts children up to age 21 years from tax liability for interest income
earned on damages for personal injuries. This exemption applies only to
children, and only for personal injuries, not for fatal injury damages.
46
b) Flexibility - Flexibility is the second most significant benefit of
structures, their continuous and flexible nature is more congruent with
the plaintiffs needs and the principles of tort compensation.
The flexibility inherent in designing structures was outlined earlier and
is a distinct advantage over lump sum damages. However, that flexibility
ends when the annuity is purchased and the finality doctrine takes hold.
The finality doctrine is of greater significance to structures because unlike
lump sum awards where the plaintiff maintains his power of discretion
over the damages, under a structure the plaintiff's discretion is sharply
limited to the extent of the payments due. There is no right under a
structure to claim or control future payments. But how significant is this
loss of control? If the damages prove inadequate there is only a short term
advantage to full discretion over the fund, at least a structure guarantees
that payments will be ongoing. Further, reserve funds described earlier in
45. Frank McKellar, "Structured Settlements - A Current Review" (1979-81), 2 The
Advocates Quarterly 389.
46. For a general reference see J.R. Wilson, "The Tax Treatment of Structured Settlements",
Law Society of Upper Canada Continuing Education Material April 23, 1983.
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this paper are not available for lump sum awards. This fund could be
used to cover extraordinary expenses or to restructure an inadequate
award. Reserve funds are like a modified review option because they
provide an opportunity to review the award and if a review is
unnecessary the principle can be reverted to the defendant, avoiding
overpayment to the plaintiff and unnecessary expense to the defendant.
c) Guaranteed Payment - Payments are guaranteed under a
structure, there is no investment worry, risk or expense. Since annuities
are self managing and the payments are tailored to expenses minimizing
any build up of capital in the plaintiff's hands, the need for a financial
management gross-up is eliminated. The peace of mind associated with
freedom from risk and administrative demands should not be
underestimated.
d) Periodic Payment - The nature of periodic payments achieves
two benefits. First, payments can be matched to anticipated expenses
which are usually due on a monthly basis. Investment income is not
usually paid out on a monthly basis and where such arrangements can be
made there is generally a loss in the rate of return. Thus structured versus
lump sum damages are more congruent with the plaintiff's spending
requirements.
The second benefit is the discouragement of dissipation. As stated
earlier, a pitfall of lump sum damages is that they can be prematurely
dissipated due to poor investment or spending resulting in the plaintiff
becoming a burden on family and or the state. This possibility is sharply
curtailed by the employment of periodic payments because the plaintiff is
not in the position to invest or spend any of the award that has not yet
become due to him. However, as further insurance against early
dissipation the plaintiff's payments cannot be attached or assigned, in
practice the plaintiff would likely be able to secure an advance from
lending institutions on the basis of guaranteed fixed future income.
e) Shifting Mortality Risk - Shifting of the mortality risk is a
significant advantage to both the plaintiff and defendant because the life
insurance company selling the annuity is not concerned with individual
mortality but aggregate mortality of a like group. Life Insurance
companies are in the business of guaranteeing mortality risks and via the
life annuities, they, not the defendant or plaintiff bear the mortality risk.
This shift means that the damages are calculated on the basis of averages
and aggregate mortality tables without any concern for unexpected
extended life span. The plaintiffs benefit is guaranteed payments for life,
if that is the agreement, while the defendant benefits because their payout
is lower than it may otherwise have been because the payments for life
removes any contingency payment for unanticipated life extension.
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f) Sub-Standard Mortality Rates - Discounted for sub-standard
mortality rates can be used by life insurance companies when issuing
annuities. Essentially the plaintiff is assigned a discounted life expectancy
and treated as older than he is for purposes of calculating the rate of
return on the principle invested. This results in higher payments for the
same principle because the payout period is expected to be shorter. This
consideration is not available for other financial investment vehicles and
while a plaintiff could achieve it by purchasing his own annuity, the
payments would be subject to taxation.
g) Benefits to Society - Society clearly stands to gain from the
increased economic efficiency of structures. In this period of insurance
crisis any savings to the insurance industry should have a stabilizing effect
on availability and affordability of insurance. It is argued that this
stability coupled with increased use of annuities increases economic
activity, employment and taxable personal and corporate income. A
decreased probability of premature dissipation and increased responsive-
ness of awards is of value to society because it should result in a decreased
burden on state social programs. The only expense of structures to society
is the questionable loss of revenue.
VI. Disadvantages of Structures
The benefits of structures must be achieved at the expense of certain
disadvantages to the plaintiff and defendant.
a) Loss of Discretion Over the Damages - From the plaintiff's
perspective the cost is freedom of control and discretion over the
damages. This is a concern when the agreed payments prove to be
inadequate or a plaintiff's priorities or needs change. For example, should
the plaintiff decide he would like to buy a house, in a structured
settlement such an expenditure would have to be anticipated; while with
a lump sum the plaintiff is able to exercise his own discretion and change
priorities and payments at will, but at a greater risk.
Discussions with practising lawyers indicate that some plaintiffs feel
the need to control the damages out of a sense of distrust of the defendant
or finality of the dispute. Some plaintiffs initially have to overcome an
impression of social assistance or welfare. These are perception problems
because the plaintiff often does not understand that the defendant is
required to pay the full principle at the time of settlement, that the
payments are guaranteed and the substantial tax and financial
management benefits that periodic payments offer them.
b) Administrative Costs and Contingent Liability - The defendant
casualty insurer, while saving money in the end by avoiding management
fee and tax gross-ups and taking advantage of sub-standard mortality
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rates and reversionary interests where applicable, does incur some
disadvantages, in particular, administrative expense and a contingent
liability for the life of the structure. Insurers are concerned with finality
of a case because the ongoing claims represent not only an unidentified
liability, but administrative costs. Structures do not offend the
crystallization and finality of the primary liability, but they do require
ongoing administrative attention and the contingent liability must remain
on the books for the remaining life of the annuity. The contingent liability
has the effect of devaluing the insurers assets because while the liability
is not likely to crystalize, the liability, not the probability, appears on their
financial statements. This could be of importance for smaller insurers
who are concerned with their financial image.
c) Trap for the Unwary - The complexity of structures and the
awesome nature of the figures associated with them make them a trap for
the unwary. This in and of itself is not a reason to avoid structures, rather
an opportunity to learn more about them.
Also to be considered in assessing the overall value of structures are
those pitfalls of the current lump sum compensation system which
structures are unable to avoid. In particular the inherent uncertainty of
assessing future care costs, lost earning capacity, inflation, and the
absence of reviewable damages.
a) Future Care Costs - These costs are currently increasing at a rate
greater than overall inflation, this creates a current valuation problem.
Further, the future care needs of plaintiffs cannot be ascertained with any
degree of certainty because every case is different. Short of reviewable
damages there is no way to avoid the inherent uncertainty of speculating
future care needs and costs.
b) Lost Earning Capacity - Lost earning capacity can never
accurately be assessed because of all the potential intervening factors such
as unemployment, economic depression, rehabilitation, etc. The
uncertainties are even more acute when the plaintiff is a child because
there is no way to accurately forecast what their career path would have
been. The nature of uncertainty in this head of damage is "what could
have been", thus not even reviewable damages, which allow the parties
to reassess the damages in the future, could completely alleviate the
vagarity of this head of damage.
c) Inflation - Inflation is a serious consideration for structures
because it has the capacity to completely undermine the adaquacy of
periodic payments. Some authors assert that the fixed payment aspect of
structures increases the risk of inflation for the plaintiff because they are
not able to take advantage of market changes and are locked into a fixed
rate of return and inflation protection, be it indexing, reserve funds or
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balloon payments. Currently lump sums provide for inflation via present
value discount rates which are a rough means of determining the current
value of future dollars.47 This method is not applicable to structures, nor
is it viewed as a reliable indicator of inflation. It is true that prudent
investment of the lump sum coupled with good fortune may provide a
better hedge on inflation, but the risks of imprudent investment and bad
fortune should not be underestimated. Safer investments tend to be debt
based with a low return and a greater vulnerability to inflation. In
addition, structures have the advantage of being non-taxable therefore
less vulnerable to devaluation in times of rising inflation. 48
Of the alternate inflation fighting methods employed by structures,
linked indexing appears to be the best. The disadvantages of lump sum
compensation for inflation is that their resulting interest income attracts
tax liability and tends to create a catch up situation which defeats the
purpose of structures. Indexing represents the most effective and
ideologically congruent alternative because the purpose of indexing is to
keep the periodic payments in synchrony with the current economic
demand. There are two methods of indexing, fixed, which is indexed at
a particular percentage or dollar amount per year or linked, where the
index is linked to a variable economic indicator such as the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), Gross National Expenditure (GNE), the Treasury Bill
Rate or any combination thereof.49 The problem with these economic
indicators is that they are historical in nature and not designed as
forecasting tools, but they are variable and are to some degree
representative of economic change, unlike fixed indexing which remains
constant despite future developments.The hazard of fixed indexing is
clearly illustrated by the thalidomide cases of the 1960's which were,
based on expert forecasts, indexed at two percent.50 Therfore, with it's
variable nature, linked indexing offers the best hedge against inflation
short of reviewable awards. The difficulty arises in relation to the
uncertainty inherent in linked indexing which makes it substantially more
expensive than fixed indexing and correspondingly less attractive. Weir in
his 1984 publication on structured settlements estimates eighty percent of
structures employed fixed indexing.51 There is no indication of where this
figure stands today, but an alternative chosen by many plaintiffs today is
a fixed index plus a periodic lump sum supplement.
47. These rates are generally set in the various provincial civil procedure rules, for example
Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rule 31.10(2).
48. Feldthusen, supra note 26, at 22.
49. Weir supra note 7, at 69-72.
50. Aid, at 10.
51. !bd, at72.
464 The Dalhousie Law Journal
d) Reviewable Damages - Although structures are not currently
reviewable the use of reserve funds creates a quasi review option. Balloon
payments could be used for the same purpose, but they would be paid
directly to the plaintiff thus the interest would be liable to tax whereas
reserve funds are used to finance an additional annuity held by the
defendant and payable to the plaintiff.
Structures would however facilitate a review process easier than would
the lump sum system, because the payouts under a structure are not
intended for future but current compensation, thus the review would only
have to determine if the periodic payments are adequate to meet the
current and future needs. There would be no necessity to consider the
amount previously paid and if it were properly dissipated, as would be
required in any review of lump sum damages.
In the final analysis of advantages and disadvantages of structures
versus lump sum damages, it is clear that structures have eliminated
some, but not all the uncertainty of damage assessment. Structures
provide a net benefit and managable disadvantages to all parties.
VII. Structured Judgments
It is evident that structured settlements have come to play an important
role in our personal and fatal injuries compensation system. The
questions, facing us now are: should this role be extended?, should courts
be imposing structured judgments?, do they have the necessary
authority?, and what advantages and disadvantages could we anticipate?
a) Do we want structured judgments? - There are primarily two
arguments against structured judgments.
i) Too Paternalistic - It is asserted that it would be unnecessarily
paternalistic of the courts to impose a form of damages that the
plaintiff did not want. Structured judgments do not deny the plaintiff's
right to damages merely the method in which they are paid. A court
might be inclined to order a structure for any of a variety of reasons;
fear of premature dissipation due to poor financial management or
spending, the uncertainty of tax gross-up or the increased economic
efficiency of structures and the resulting benefits for society.
The first of the reasons places the court in the position of big-
brother looking out for those it believes cannot take care of
themselves. The plaintiff may or may not be financially sophisticated,
but that is not for the court to determine because it is not an issue at
trial. Some might argue that the gross-up for management fees puts the
plaintiff's financial sophistication into issue, but this is not necessarily
the case, the sheer size of the award or age of the plaintiff could make
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outside financial management a necessary and prudent requirement.
Justice Spence stated in Arnold v. Teno that;
Even if the plaintiff were an adult and not disabled, she would need
professional assistance in the management of such a large sum of money
as is being awarded in this case.
52
Thus on a purely individualistic level it is paternalistic of the court
to impose structured judgments for the mere purpose of avoiding
premature dissipation, but there are saving factors. The courts other
reasons could relate to the benefits to be derived by society. Premature
dissipation of damages translates into a burden on social programs and
tax dollars, structures can decrease the probability of such reliance and
tailor the damages more closely to the plaintiff's actual needs. This
coupled with the other benefits to society as discussed under structured
settlements establishes a strong public policy argument in favour of
structured judgments.
(ii) Restriction of the Plaintiff's Rights - Social benefits cannot in
and of themselves justify structured judgments. There must be no
adverse affect on the plaintiff such that he would be prevented from
achieving the purpose for which the damages were intended, that of
placing him in as similar a position as possible to that he would have
been in but for the injury. The only disadvantage to the plaintiff
resulting from structured judgment over lump sum damages is the loss
of freedom of discretion over the total damage award, but if properly
designed the structured judgment does not preclude the plaintiff from
being adequately compensated, if anything it ensures that he will be.
Currently the courts go to great lengths to ensure that the plaintiff's
needs are adequately compensated and the defendant is liable for
significant management and tax gross-ups above and beyond the
actual damages, yet the plaintiff is under no obligation to use the
damages for the purposes for which they were intended, he has full
discretion to spend the funds in any manner he sees fit. While a
structure does not guarantee that the funds will be used for their
intended purpose it sharply decreases the plaintiff's access to funds and
resulting investment and spending ability. An argument against this
restriction of discretion is that it is discriminatory, that other windfall
recipients such as lottery winners and testamentary beneficiaries are
not limited in control over their windfall. The major difference is that
such windfalls were not given with a prescribed purpose, unless of
course it was a conditional testamentary gift in which case the courts
generally hold the condition to be valid. Further the recipients of such
52. Arnold supra note 11, at 328.
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windfalls have not lost their future income earning capacity as have
many plaintiffs in personal injury cases.
b) Do courts have the authority to impose structured judgments? -
In terms of requisite jurisdiction courts generally reject any notion that
they have the authority to grant damages in any form other than lump
sum. A case which is cited as authority for this position is Fetter v.
Beale53, which held that after recovery for an injurious act, no action can
be maintained on account of any consequences occasioned by that act.
Essentially the case affirms the doctrines of finality and res judicata,
which provides that damages are for once and for all and precludes
litigation of the same matter twice. There is nothing in the case which
states that damages must be paid in a lump sum or precludes the use of
periodic payments. Structures do not offend the finality doctrine because
they are final at the time the structure is purchased and neither party can
alter the terms. The contingent liability held by the casualty insurer is a
contractual term between the insurer and the life insurance company
selling the annuity.
Andrews is another case cited to support the argument that courts lack
the inherent jurisdiction to award structured judgments. A statement
from that case quoted earlier in this paper was a plea by Justice Dickson,
as he was then, for legislative intervention authorizing periodic awards.
This statement implies that Justice Dickson believed the Supreme Court
of Canada to be without the inherent jurisdiction to impose damages in
the form of periodic payments. The Supreme Court is free to backtrack
from this inference especially since the comment was made prior to the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the court's new pro-active role in
creating and interpreting law. The Charter should offer valid arguments
for the rights of plaintiffs and defendants and reasonable limits to such
rights under s. 1.
Therefore, adherence to lump sum damages is merely a common law
tradition and as such can be ignored except where statutorily expressed
as in the Ontario Courts of Justice Act s. 129. This provision allows
courts in Ontario to award structured judgment where both parties
consent, thereby implying that structured judgments are not otherwise
authorized. Other provinces are not restricted by such statutory
inferences.
Despite this conclusion courts are likely to uphold the traditional
approach and resist the pro-active approach taken by the Manitoba
Court of Appeal in Watkins,54 where the court assumed an inherent
jurisdiction to award structured judgments. The most direct and certain
53. (1702), 91 E.R. 1122.
54. Watkins v. Olafson, [1987] 5 W.W.R. 193 (Man. C.A.).
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method to establish judicial jurisdiction for structured judgments would
be via legislative reform. This would erase any doubt and put pressure on
the courts to consider more closely the alternative of structured
judgments and the adequacy of tort compensation for personal injuries.
Legislation would also ensure that a coherent structured judgment
scheme was uniformly available and applied.
c) What advantages and disadvantages could we anticipate?
(i) There is no reason to believe that any of the benefits of structured
settlements would be lost because Revenue Canada does not make a
distinction between damage awards versus settlements and the other
benefits would not be altered by a change in the manner in which the
structure was achieved.
(ii) The real issue is what the concerns of structured judgments will
be outside the loss of discretion for the plaintiff. Administration costs
and procedures and how our Legal system would deal with structured
judgments would be the greatest concern.
There are two possible procedures for imposing structured
judgments. First the court could hear evidence and determine in detail
the structure to be imposed. Second, the court could determine the
principle for which the defendant will be liable and let the plaintiff
design the structure most appropriate to his needs. The burgeoning
workload and responsibilities of our judicial system demand as
efficient a process as possible, thus the evidentary burdens of a court
determined structure would be unreasonable. Rather, since the
plaintiff is in the best position to know his needs, he, not the court
could most efficiently design an appropriate structure. The risk is that
the plaintiff would allocate the payouts in a manner which would
defeat the purpose of a structure. This could be overcome through the
requirement of a court approval for the proposed structure. The courts
could employ the same review procedure established in Fucsh5 5 for
the approval of structures for infants and incompetents.
In determining the appropriate principle the court would be
required to go through the same calculations and assessments it would
undertake to determine a lump sum award except for the calculation
of the tax and management fee gross-up. Currently when lawyers are
considering a structured settlement in order to determine the principle
for an acceptable structure they calculate the lump sum including the
tax and management fee gross-ups and discount that figure anywhere
from ten to forty percent of the claim.
56
55. Fucsh, supra note 32.
56. Savings associated with structures have been reported to be as great as 50%. See Weir
supra note 7, at 67, "Structured Settlements, the Claims Persons View", For The Defence, May
1988, at 29.
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Inflation would have to be considered by any proposed structured
judgment scheme. Since the court does not have to worry about
bargaining power, as do the parties of the dispute, the court could
freely employ the more expensive option of linked indexing. The
legislation enabling structured judgments could specify the appropriate
linking factor or it could be left to the court to determine on evidence
presented at trial. The court's use of linked indexing would encourage
parties to voluntarily consent to this more representative method of
indexing over the inflexible fixed method.
All heads of damage would have to be calculated on an after tax
basis to avoid overcompensating the plaintiff. This is particularly
important for lost future earning capacity which under the Jennings
rule is calculated on pre-tax dollars in order to compensate for
anticipated tax loss, because there is no tax loss associated with
structures this rule should not apply.
57
Any recommended scheme for structured settlements must include
judicial discretion. This is necessitated by virtue of the fact that
structures are not appropriate in all cases. The objective of the court
should be to provide restitutio in integrem in whatever form would be
appropriate in the particular case at hand.
There are several reasons to believe that structured judgments are
viable today. Both the courts and the practising bar are familiar with
the concept and structures that have been employed over a long
enough period that their results can be evaluated. The "insurance
crisis" of the 1980's has heightened the need for a more economically
efficient compensation system. Further the needs compensation
objective of damages can be more closely achieved through the use of
structures, and finally the government is being lobbied for structured
judgments by some very influential groups including the insurance
industry and the practising bar.58
d) Canadian case law on structured judgments - A discussion of
structured judgments would not be complete without a careful analysis of
the case law. Watkins v. Olafson, 59 was the first of only two reported
structured settlements in Canada. In Watkins the Manitoba Court of
Appeal imposed a structured judgment while varying damages awarded
at trial for a motor vehicle accident which rendered the thirty-three year
old plaintiff a quadriplegic. The appeal was not heard until nine years
after the accident, during which period interim payments were made.
57. Feldthusen, supra note 26, at 17.
58. Refer to structured judgment proposals by the Ontario branch of the Canadian Bar
Association to the Slater Commission and the proposal by MacKellar to the Osborne
Commission.
59. Watkins, supra note 54.
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Two facts were found by the Appeal Court to be of particular
importance, first, the province of Manitoba was a defendant party in the
matter, second, while the plaintiff expressed an interest to live
independently he had spent a cumulative total of six of the last nine years
in hospital under the free care of the provincial health plan.
The appeal was launched by the defendants against the quantum of
damages awarded under all heads of damages except non-pecuniary and
special damages. While allowing the appeal and varying the damages the
court took an admittedly innovative approach and applied a structured
settlement to the future care head of damages awarding lump sum for all
other heads. By employing a structure they were able to avoid the
concerns regarding the uncertainty of tax gross-up, anticipated life
expectancy and inflation.
The court did not stop at the conventional structured scheme, but
modified the continuous payment aspect by stipulating a condition
precedent. The government of Manitoba was ordered to pay into court
annually a sum sufficient to cover the maximum payments for that year,
the fund was then to be controlled by a trustee who would make monthly
payments to the plaintiff once it had been established that he was living
independently and not under the provincial health care program. Any
remaining balance in the fund was to be credited to the province.
The judgment does not mention an annuity, thus compliance with
Revenue Canada requirements and subsequent tax benefits are
questionable, and if they are available would they be available to a
private defendant under a similar structure?
The court did not have any difficulty in awarding the structure in
relation to future care only. This is of particular importance because there
were substantial interim payments made to the plaintiff which the court
held against the lump sum award, this would not have been possible if the
structure were viewed as an all or nothing means of damage payment and
could have discouraged defendants in the future from advancing interim
payments. 60
In effect the court imposed a reviewable award subject to collateral
benefits enjoyed by the plaintiff. Currently, most collateral benefits are
clearly excluded in calculating lump sum damages61 and under structured
settlements they are a matter of negotiation between the parties, noting
that if the matter went to trial they would not be considered.
Ideologically, collateral benefits should be considered when compensa-
tion is made on a pure needs versus loss basis; however, our tort system
60. Interim payments are an important means of minimizing claim liability. See C.J. Horkins,
"Tactics to Limit You Exposure", WlthoutPrejudice, April 1988, at 49.
61. Weir, supra note 7, at 26.
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even with it's new needs perspective has not yet abandoned it's protection
of collateral benefits and is unlikely given their traditional view that the
consideration of collateral benefits leads to an unwarranted windfall for
the defendant and would discourage individuals from providing
themselves with insurance pensions and other such collateral benefits. As
such it would seem unfair and inconsistent to consider collateral benefits
under structured judgments when they are not treated similarly under
lump sum damages. In the very least, collateral benefits should be treated
equally under both forms of compensation.
The judgment clearly states that the structure was feasible because of
two conditions; the province was a defendant in the action and they also
bear the financial responsibility for the provincial health care system. The
motivation for the award would appear to be protection of government
coffers by preventing a plaintiff from claiming future care costs from the
same defendant who would in a different capacity be required to provide
free health care. The problem with this is that it ignores the provincial
health care program's right to subrogation for health care provided in
relation to a tortious act.62 This sets a dangerous precedent which could
be extended beyond the limits which the court intended. Clearly hospital
services have no better or worse right to subrogation because one of the
defendants is itself. What if the federal government were a defendant to
the action, would they receive special treatment? There is little doubt that
if the defendant were a private insurance company the plaintiff would not
have been limited in his claim for future care costs, he would have been
able to collect the full amount despite his living independently or under
provincial health care.
The court states that it is their duty to keep damages to as reasonable
a level as possible without under compensating the plaintiff, because they
must protect the public interest and because the legislature has failed to
respond to the times. This is a valid argument, but there is a counter
argument that they have indeed under compensated the plaintiff by
refusing him his full claim to future care damages merely by incidence of
who the defendant was rather than by any other legal principle.
This decision rejects lump sum damages as unworkable in adequately
compensating plaintiffs for future care costs because of the uncertainty of
tax gross-ups, life expectancy, future care needs, rate of return on
investments and the discount rate to be used. The court noted that lump
sum awards are growing larger to compensate for the additional expenses
they attract, such as management fees and tax gross-ups. Such expenses
62. The particulars of subrogation are beyond the scope of this paper, but as a matter of course
provincial health plans do subrogate health care expenses in insurance and workmen's
compensation cases. See Ontario Health Insurance Plan, infra note 64.
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do not relate to the plaintiff's compensation, but if not considered in the
award the plaintiff will be under compensated and the court's efforts to
determine the appropriate award are in vain. The court saw structures as
a means of avoiding many of the pitfalls of lump sum while still being fair
to all parties. It is important to note that all three justices sitting on the
Appeal Bench agreed with the structured judgment and the form in
which it was imposed.
In terms of jurisdiction the court took the view that they had the
requisite authority because they were not barred by statute or any
principle of common law. I agree with this argument although many
writers would not. This particular issue is discussed in greater detail
earlier in this paper.
In summary Watkins is a promising case in that the court recognized
the benefits of structures and the need for courts to employ this form of
compensation. However it is a graphic illustration of the need for
legislative intervention to set in place a coherent structured judgment
scheme to avoid arbitrary application of the remedy. It should be noted
that the case has not been appealed and does not represent an
authoritative precedent for other courts.
Webber v. Crawford63 decided in July 1988, is the second and most
recent structured judgment. In that case the defence proposed a structured
judgment to the court and on a complete canvass of the issue the court
endorsed and applied the Watkins decision. The court did not invoke the
same review option that Watkins created, rather they prescribed the
appropriate future care for the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to
purchase an annuity to provide the necessary funds on a continuous basis
until the plaintiff's death. The structure was only for the future care head
of damages with lump sums being awarded for past and future lost
earnings.
It is interesting to note that the decision was rendered in a jurisdiction
which does not allow tax gross-ups, therefore the savings factor would
not be as great as it would be for other jurisdictions, but the adequacy of
compensation would be improved. This would indicate that the savings
are not the only persuasive argument for structured judgments.
Another case to be noted is Ontario Health Insurance Plan v. United
States Fidelity and Casualty Insurance Company.64 This case did not
impose a structured judgment but dealt with the issue of subrogation by
the provincial health plan against the defendant casualty insurer. The
plaintiff in the case accepted a structure within the policy liability limits
for a claim that if settled in a lump sum would have far exceeded the
63. [1988], B.C.J. No. 1357 (B.C.S.C.).
64. [1987] I.L.R. 1-2135 (O.S.C.).
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liability limit. The Ontario Health Insurance Plan wanted to subrogate
against the balance of the liability limit. The court applied the rule that
the right to subrogation does not arise until the plaintiff is fully
compensated and held that the plaintiff had settled for less than full
compensation and the right to subrogation did not arise. The importance
of this decision stems from the fact that either directly or indirectly the
court protected the dollar savings incentive of structured judgments. It
would be difficult to entice many defendant liability insurers to agree to
a structure or support structured settlements if they did not receive some
savings to offset the administrative costs and ongoing contingent liability.
These cases combined indicate that courts are becoming impatient
with the legislatures and are weary of making the best of the current lump
sum system of compensation. The courts' careful application and
integration of structures indicates that they are exercising discretion and
are not prepared to abandon the current system entirely, but extend it to
include structures.
VIII. Perspective of Bench, Bar and Casualty Insurance Industry
Interviews with lawyers indicated a general support for structured
settlements, but a split in support for structured judgments. Most used or
were aware of structured settlements and were fairly knowledgeable
about the benefits and pitfalls of structures. Some felt structured
judgments would be beneficial, enabling cases appropriate for a structure,
but for some reason resistant, to enjoy the increased economic efficiency
and adequacy of the periodic payment. Others felt the plaintiff has a right
to dissipate the damages as they see fit and that it would be too
paternalistic of the court to impose a duty on the plaintiff.
Although only one judge was interviewed, the response was consistent
with what would be expected of the bench. Primarily there was a concern
with regard to jurisdiction of the court to award damages in any form
other than lump sum. Secondly, there was a concern that the court would
be going too far in the arrangement of the personal finances of the
plaintiff - essentially too paternalistic. There was also a concern for the
administrative implications of such a system, the criteria upon which a
structured judgment should be imposed, the extent of the courts
involvement in structure design and the corresponding demands on the
court's time. The bench was not dismissive of structures, they felt that
they should be encouraged at pre-trial, but would be unwilling to impose
a structured judgment without some action by the legislature or the
Supreme Court of Canada.
In general, casualty insurance companies are very supportive of
structured judgments to maximize the benefit to be achieved by this form
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of damage compensation. One significant casualty insurer in Nova Scotia
stated that it was their objective to structure all personal and fatal injury
claims. 65 Five years ago their success rate was approximately one percent,
today it is hovering over fifty percent with a greater success rate for
claims over a million dollars. A recent example of a successful structure
concerned a twenty year old girl from a wealthy Ontario family who
suffered a broken neck while working on a Katimavic project here in
Nova Scotia. The young woman was a bright student with prospects for
a career in law. The plaintiff's claim was handled by a top Toronto
litigator who accepted on behalf of his client a two point seven million
dollar structure on a lump sum claim valuation of four million dollars.
Indications from structured specialists, insurance industry and plaintiff
bar indicate there are approximately six claims per year in Nova Scotia
that exceed one million dollars, with a significantly larger number falling
within the one hundred thousand dollar to one million dollar range.
There are no statistics on a provincial or national basis, which
substantiate this estimate. Nor are there any statistics available for Nova
Scotia or elsewhere in Canada, indicating the prevalence of structures. A
1987 American study stated that structures were used in fifty percent of
personal and fatal injury claims in the United States and at a growing, but
unidentified rate in Canada. 66
From the defence bar perspective structures are easier to negotiate now
because there are a limited number of lawyers practicing in the insurance
area in Nova Scotia and they have developed a competent level of
knowledge and familiarity with the structured concept. Indications are
that this is true in other areas of the country and that a direct relationship
exists between the familiarity with the structure concept, the prevalence
of structures and ease of negotiation.
The first hurdle that structures meet are the prejudices and practices of
the practicing bar. All structured specialists believe that a lack of
awareness and resistance of the unknown stunt the application potential
of structures. The fact that structures have been around for some time
now and the visibility of their results have decreased this problem. Some
lawyers have suggested that it would be negligent for a lawyer practicing
in the area of personal and fatal injuries to not consider the structure
alternative.
The second hurdle remaining is the plaintiff himself. Lawyers and
structured specialists now focus on educating plaintiffs about structures
and the advantages they offer.67 Most plaintiff resistance stems from
65. This objective excludes discretionary claims such as whiplash.
66. D. Harvey, "Structured Settlements", Canadian Underwriter, April 1987, at 28.
67. See, "Plaintiff's Guide to Structured Settlements", Baxter Annuities.
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ignorance of the concept and or an inappropriate allocation between up-
front and periodic payments. This highlights the need to identify the
plaintiffs needs and wants accurately and design the structure
appropriately. Lawyers generally acknowledge that their presentation of
the structure concept has significant influence on the plaintiff. Because of
the weight of their presentation and the awesome nature of the figures
associated with structures, most plaintiff lawyers prefer to review the
structure alternative themselves, prior to showing it to the client.
IX. Conclusions
It is evident that structured settlements are beneficial in personal injuries
claims, with a direct relationship between the advantages and the
increasing severity of the injury and resulting future care needs. Structures
benefit not only the parties involved but society as well. The advantages
of structures vary with the circumstances and are not always better than
lump sum damages. The need for structures, and their advantages, are
based on the pitfalls of lump sums; if these pitfalls could be corrected the
need and advantages of structures would decrease correspondingly. Until
that time, structures facilitate the shift from compensating the plaintiff's
loss to compensating their needs in personal and fatal injuries
compensation. If the shift to needs compensation is to be complete
structured judgments must be used to ensure that plaintiffs in jurisdictions
without tax and or management fee gross-ups are adequately
compensated and protected from erosion of their awards from these
variables. Structures by their periodic nature provide a more adequate
and fair remedy for personal and fatal injury claims because they replace
any loss of continuous income and pay for future care needs as they arise
without placing great responsibility and risk on the plaintiff to invest and
spend the damages wisely.
Although structured settlements have enjoyed increasing success, as
awareness of and experience with structures grows there will always be
cases where structured settlements would be appropriate, but are refused.
Structured judgments give the courts the opportunity to reclaim the
advantages of structures where they would otherwise be lost. There is no
worry that structured judgments would kill off the use of structured
settlements, quite the reverse, the loss of control by the parties resulting-
from litigation in addition to the resulting expenses would encourage
parties to settle out of court and use structures where appropriate because
if even one party wanted a structure and the case was appropriate for a
structure, they could force the matter to court and achieve there what
they could not in negotiated settlement. Although dated, a 1965 study
indicated that less than five out of one hundred personal injury claims
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reached litigation, the balance were settled. The ever rising costs of
litigation have only served to reinforce this settlement trend. Most
litigators would state that the majority of clients are better served by
settlement than litigation and their objective is to only litigate in the
relatively small number of cases where litigation is beneficial, for example
where a principle or liability is at issue.
68
In these days of the Charter the most common argument which is
mounted against structured judgments is the imposed loss of the plaintiff's
freedom of discretion over the damage award. This argument is made
despite any advantages to the plaintiff, but as discussed earlier such
limitations should be found reasonable under s.1.
Judges and counsel will have to be educated about structures and
where they are most effectively employed. A judicial procedure will have
to be designed to maximize the efficiency and advantages of structures.
There would be little hope of the judiciary developing a coherent and
consistent system of structured judgments without legislative intervention
because some courts and counsel would resist the new alternative.
Legislative reform would offer the greatest uniformity of procedure and
availability of this remedy.
One of the best features of the tort compensation system is the ability
to tailor awards to the specific case. Historically the courts were
concerned with appeasing the plaintiff to avoid retributive acts, later the
goal was to compensate loss and today the concern is for the plaintiff's
future needs. It is only logical that one method of compensation could not
adequately achieve these various goals. Lump sum damages are no longer
generally suitable for personal and fatal injuries compensation. Structures
are better suited to the current objective of needs based compensation. To
not empower the courts to employ this proven tool is to handicap them
in their attempt to fairly compensate the plaintiff without overburdening
the defendant, and to ensure that damage awards for personal and fatal
injuries will be unnecessarily complex and expensive.
68. Weir, supra note 7, at 23.
